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An Overview of Recent Legal Developments in South 
Africa with Regard to the Position of Lesbigay Parents 
and Children with Specific Reference to the Adoption of 
Children* 
 
J.A. Robinson 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A constitutional dispensation designed to innovate social, political, 
and legal structures that would be radically different from those of South 
Africa‘s past history1 came into effect in South Africa on April 27, 1994. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter 
referred to as the Interim Constitution) not only recognized the injustices 
of the past, but also depicted the new South Africa as an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom. To 
this end, a Bill of Rights was entrenched in the Interim Constitution to 
provide legally enforceable backing.
2
 In the new dispensation, any 
 
* This contribution to some extent overlaps with articles published in the Forum Iuris 
Internationalis, Franz Lizt Lecture Series (Justus Liebig University Gießen, Germany) under the title 
―Children‘s Rights in the Constitution of South Africa‖ and J.A. Robinson, The Best Interests of 
Children in Custody Litigation Where Homosexualism of a Parent is a Consideration, 2005 J. JURID. 
SCI. 107. 
 1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 
1993) came into effect on this date. It effected radical changes in the sense that henceforth the 
franchise and associated political and civil rights would be accorded to all citizens without racial 
qualification and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was now replaced by the doctrine of 
constitutional supremacy. Thise Interim Constitution was formally adopted as an Act of the pre-
democratic Tri-cameral Parliament and was only meant to be a transitional constitution. One of its 
principal purposes was to set out the procedures for the negotiation and drafting of the final 
constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (S. AFR. CONST. 1996) 
completes the negotiated revolution. Thise Constitution was drafted and adopted by an Elected 
Constitutional Assembly which had been afforded two years to produce a constitution that 
conformed to 34 constitutional principles agreed upon during the pre-1993 political negotiations. In 
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (1996) (First Certification Judgment) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.) the 
Constitutional Court refused to certify that the Constitution conformed to the said principles and it 
was only in the so-called Second Certification Judgment 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) (S. Afr.) that the 
Constitutional Court was prepared to find that the text was consistent with the constitutional 
principles. The Constitution was signed into law by President Nelson Mandela at Sharpeville on 
February 4, 1997. See JOHAN DE WAAL, IAIN CURRIE & GERHARD ERASMUS THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
HANDBOOK ch 1 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter DE WAAL ET AL.]. 
 2. In the preamble to the Interim Constitution, it is specifically stated that the injustices of 
the country‘s past are recognized and that the Constitution is adopted as the supreme law of the 
country so as to heal the divisions of the past and to establish a society based on democratic values, 
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institution associated with the discrimination and repression practices of 
apartheid South Africa would be incompatible with the values embodied 
in the kind of society the country would henceforth aspire to be.
3
 The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (hereafter 
referred to as the Constitution) echoes the values, principles, and norms 
of the Interim Constitution. 
Institutionalized discrimination constituted a major characteristic of 
the political history of South Africa. Not only racial discrimination, but 
also sex discrimination (including discrimination based on sexual 
orientation) and age discrimination were inscribed into the social fabric 
of apartheid South Africa. Consequently, the principle of equal treatment 
and non-discrimination has been afforded a special place in the 
Constitution. Section 9 of the Constitution therefore expressly prohibits 
unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, on grounds of, inter alia, 
sexual orientation, sex, and age.
4
 
The change in the political dispensation in 1994 has definitely 
impacted the issue of gay/lesbian couples and children related to one (or 
both) of the partners in the relationship. In view of the fact that the new 
constitutional dispensation reflects radically new values and norms, a 
proper understanding of the legal status of such relationships is only 
possible if cognizance is taken of the legal-historical background of such 
relationships and children. It is also clear that constitutional prescriptions 
pertaining to such relationships on the one hand, and to children‘s rights 
within such relationships on the other, must form the focal point of this 
contribution. The contribution focuses on the influence of homosexuality 
of a parent in matters pertaining to adoption of children against the 
background of recent developments relating to the parent-child 
relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
social justice, and fundamental human rights. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 pmbl. 
 3. J.D. Van der Vyver, Constitutional Protection of Children and Young Persons, in THE 
LAW OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 265, 267 (J.A. Robinson ed., 1997). 
 4. In fact, South Africa is the first state to expressly prohibit discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation in its constitution. A distinction needs to be drawn between sex and sexual 
orientation. ‗Sex‘ is a biological term, whereas ‗gender‘ is a social term. ‗Sex‘ therefore refers to the 
biological and physical differences between men and women. Discrimination based on sex would 
therefore occur, for example, in situations in which pregnant women are discriminated against on 
that basis. Gender, on the other hand, refers to the ascribed social and cultural male and female roles. 
An example of gender discrimination would therefore be prejudicial treatment arising out of 
parenting roles. See DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 215. 
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II.  THE PRE-1994 PERIOD 
 
A.  Historical Background 
 
Before 1994, the Westminster system of government applied in 
South Africa, accompanied by the principle of sovereignty of Parliament. 
Therefore, courts of law did not have the competence to question the 
legality of parliamentary legislation. The famous dictum of Blackstone 
that ―[w]hat the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo‖ 
indeed held true for the position in South Africa and had a marked 
influence on formal attitudes towards marriage and families.
5
 
The concept of marriage, as it existed in this period, to a substantial 
extent reflected the position in Canon law and Roman Dutch law. Canon 
law, basically Roman law modernized and adapted to meet the needs of 
the medieval church, was received into Roman Dutch law.
6
 The Catholic 
Church of the Middle Ages was not only a spiritual institution. It was 
also a state with its own legislature and courts of law. The jurisdiction of 
the Church not only included all matters concerning the organization and 
property of the Church, but also matters connected with faith, 
sacraments, and sin.
7
 The Church‘s jurisdiction overlapped to some 
extent with that of secular courts. The means by which the Church 
secured enforcement of its decrees was excommunication. However, 
judgments of ecclesiastical courts were enforced by Government qua the 
secular arm of the Church. 
The sources of Canon law were primarily the Bible, the writings of 
Church fathers, Justinian‘s codification of the Corpus Juris, the canons 
of Church councils, and the decretals of the popes. 
 
The Church teaches, as a matter of revealed truth, that ―Christ our Lord 
elevated the very contract of marriage between baptized persons to the 
dignity of a sacrament.‖ . . . Thus, the marriage contract between two 
 
 5. Perhaps the correct point of departure to understand the socio-legal background currently 
prevailing in South Africa is to reflect on the notions of Afrikaner nationalism and especially the 
religious inclination of the Afrikaner. The combination of these two factors provided a dominant 
consideration within the constitutional dispensation in the period before 1994. In the period 
stretching from the early 1930s, Afrikaner nationalism became a strong driving force in the country. 
In essence, though, Afrikaner nationalism was intertwined with the religious dogma of Jean Calvin. 
As such, it created a framework which had a definite impact on views held by the legislature and the 
courts on the nature of marriage and families. The constitutional exposition, as set out,  held true 
until 1994. See W.J. HOSTEN, CARMEN NATHAN, A.B. EDWARDS & FRANCIS BOSMAN, 
INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 315 (1977). 
 6. H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS 
BACKGROUND 511 (1968). 
 7. Id. at 511. 
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married persons is a sacrament—‖an outward sign instituted by Christ 
to give grace.‖ The ―outward sign‖ here is the mutual external 
manifestation of internal consent by the two parties to the marriage 
contract. . . . It is the contract of marriage which is the sacrament. An 
invalid contract is, in fact, a non-existent contract and hence cannot be 
a sacrament.
8
 
 
The status created by marriage as a sacrament was instituted by God; it 
was a natural relationship whose ends and essential properties were 
determined by natural law. These ends and properties could not be varied 
by human legislation, either civil or ecclesiastical, or by the consent of 
the parties. ―The primary end or purpose of marriage, as instituted by 
God, is the procreation and rearing of children.‖9 
Roman Dutch Law embraced Montesquieu‘s philosophies that the 
powers of legislation, administration, and adjudication had to be 
separated and that each had to be entrusted to a different organ with the 
legislature supreme.
10
 The old ecclesiastical courts were abolished and 
the Reformed Church became the State Church of the Netherlands. By 
virtue of the ius majestas circa sacra, the Church was subject to control 
by government. Matters relating to doctrine and service were left solely 
to the decision of the clerical authorities, but all matters relating to the 
position of the Church in the community and the legal consequences of 
acts performed in church, including marriage, were henceforth the 
concern of the State.
11
 Through the ius supremae inspectionis, 
government exercised supervision over the appointment of ministers in 
the Church. 
The marriage law of this period was prescribed in the Political 
Ordinance of 1580 and the Perpetual Edict of 1540. Both these 
instruments reflected the philosophies of the Reformation and to some 
extent secularized marriage law. Even though the doctrine of the 
sacramental nature of marriage was disclaimed, the idea of marriage 
being a divine institution in its general origin subsisted. The rules of 
Canon law, which had their foundation not in the sacrament or in any 
religious view of the subject but in marriage as a natural and civil 
contract, were retained.
12
 Therefore, in view of Biblical texts it was 
accepted that marriage is a relationship between one man and one 
 
 8. Joseph M. Snee, S.J., The Canon Law of Marriage: An Outline, 35 U.DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 309, 311–12 (1958) (quoting 1917 CODE c.1012, § 1). 
 9. Id. at 313. 
 10. HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 6, at 528. 
 11. Id. 
 12. H.R. HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 11 (3d ed.). 
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woman. It was especially the comparison of the relationship between a 
husband and a wife with that of Christ and His congregation that 
provided for the view of marriage as a relationship exclusively between 
one man and one woman.
13
 
The exclusive definition of the nature of marriage as it existed in 
Roman Dutch law was received part and parcel into South African law. 
Besides numerous Roman Dutch texts, South African courts also referred 
often to the well-known English decision in Hyde v Hyde and 
Woodmansee,
14
 in which it is stated that ―[m]arriage as understood in 
Christendom is the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, 
to the exclusion of all others.‖ The biblical justification for marriage as 
an exclusive relationship between one man and one woman was reflected 
holus bolus by the moral and legal climate predating the Interim 
Constitution.
15
 
 
B.  The Institution of Marriage Before 1994 
 
South African courts have from time to time reconsidered the nature 
of marriage. The position the courts took, however, was a relatively 
simple one. In Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal), the issue before 
the court related to a potentially polygamous union. 
 
Bearing in mind the essential characteristics of marriage, it is clear that 
the union in question was not a marriage, as we understand it. It parties 
contracted, but forbidden by our own and fundamentally opposed to our 
principles and institutions. And it is impossible for our Courts when 
dealing directly with the position of a party to such a union to say that 
she ever was the wife in the sense in which our law uses that term. . . . 
It is a hard result . . . that a woman validly married in one part of the 
British Empire should not be treated as a wife in another part. But relief 
can only properly be sought from the Legislature.
16
 
 
The monogamous form of marriage—though it was open to all 
population groups irrespective of race, nationality, or religion—was out 
of step with fundamental views held by groups of different cultural and 
religious backgrounds. The pressure exerted by this state of affairs led to 
various statutory enactments which, on an ad hoc basis, conferred some 
 
 13. See Ephesians 5:23–33. 
 14. L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, 130 (1866). 
 15. C.R.M. Dlamini, The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs, 1991 ACTA 
JURIDICA 71, 75 (1991). 
 16. 1917 A.D. 302 at 309 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
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of the consequences—patrimonial and personal—on relationships 
resembling that of marriage. In this fashion it was intended to alleviate 
some of the harsh consequences that followed the non-recognition of 
unions which did not conform to Roman Dutch prescripts.
17
 In addition 
to the statutory measures mentioned above, it should be noted that 
Roman Dutch law already made provision for marriages that were void 
ab initio and that consequently possessed none of the consequences of a 
valid marriage to be accepted as putative. If the marriage had been 
solemnized with prescribed formalities (quod matrimonium fuerit rite et 
solemniter secundum morem patriae contractum) and at least one of the 
spouses had contracted the marriage in good faith (quod adfuerit bona 
fides in facto ipsorum contrahendium, vel saltem unius eorum) certain of 
the effects of a legal marriage would attach to it.
18
 
Within the framework set out above, it was rather predictable how 
courts would deal with issues falling outside of the ambit of the marriage 
description reflected by Roman Dutch law. Contentious issues that came 
before the courts from time to time related to the position of same-sex 
partners—the question of whether people who had undergone a sex-
change operation could conclude a marriage and the recognition of 
religious marriages. The court in all these instances applied the concept 
of marriage as reflected in Roman Dutch law: essentially it was a 
relationship between one man and one woman and no exception would 
be accepted.
19
 
 
C.  Constitutional Background to the Legal Position of Gay/Lesbian 
Parents and Children Related to Their Relationship 
 
In the era of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament was the supreme 
law-making authority in the state and all citizens and organs of state, 
including the courts, were subservient to Parliament.
20
 As a result, there 
were no particular judicial constraints on Parliament. A court could only 
declare an act invalid if it had not been passed in accordance with the 
procedures for passing legislation that had been laid down in the 
 
 17. See generally Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray, The Contest Between Culture and 
Gender Equality Under South Africa’s Interim Constitution 21 J.L. & SOC‘Y 409 (1994) (for a 
comprehensive exposition of such enactments). 
 18. HAHLO, supra note 12, at 11. 
 19. Respecting sex change operations, see W v W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W) (S. Afr.); Simms v 
Simms 1981 (4) SA 186 (D&C) (S. Afr.); with regard to Muslim marriage, see Ismail v Ismail 1983 
(1) SA 1006 (A) (S. Afr.); Seedat’s Ex’rs v The Master 1917 A.D. 302 (S. Afr.); in relation to same-
sex relationships, see Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W) (S. Afr.). 
 20. See Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) (S. Afr.); Minister of the 
Interior v Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (A) (S. Afr.). 
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Constitution—the courts could not review parliamentary legislation on 
substantive grounds.
21
 There was no provision for a court to declare an 
act of Parliament invalid on the grounds that it, for instance, violated 
fundamental human rights or that it was against the boni mores. 
Contrary to the situation with regard to parliamentary legislation, 
courts were frequently called upon to adjudicate issues of common law 
on the basis of the boni mores. In Olsen v Standaloft
22
 the court 
conveyed that the mores is not a static concept; in fact, since they reflect 
the fundamental assumptions of the community, the mores vary from 
country to country and era to era: 
 
 Such flexibility may manifest itself in two ways: by closing down of 
existing heads of public policy and by the opening of new heads. There 
is no doubt that an existing head of public policy may be declared 
redundant . . . . 
 A final observation may be made as to the way in which the courts 
determine the content of public policy. Apart from reliance on previous 
precedents, this is done by a priori deductions from broad general 
principles. It is not the practice . . . for parties to lead sociological or 
economic evidence as to whether particular practices are harmful and it 
is doubtful to what extent such evidence would be regarded as relevant 
if it were adduced.
23
 
 
The reference to ―deductions from broad general principles‖ may 
justifiably lead to the conclusion that the determination of the boni mores 
rested squarely within the discretion of a presiding judge. The possibility 
that was left for the personal inclinations of judges when they had to 
decide on mores pertaining to legal questions had been criticized 
severely. One author explains that the mores had clearly been tainted by 
the fact that judges had been mostly elderly, white males from 
Calvinistic backgrounds.
24
 The correctness of this critique for purposes 
 
 21. See, e.g., Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (A) (S. Afr.). 
 22. 1983 (2) SA 668 (ZSC) (S. Afr.). 
 23. N.C. SEDDON & M.P. ELLINGHAUS, CHESHIRE AND FIFOOT‘S LAW OF CONTRACT 331 
(9th ed., 2008) (emphasis added). 
 24. In Minister of Law & Order v Kadir, the court pronounced as follows on the subject: 
 
[A]s the judgments . . . illustrate, conclusions as to the existence of a legal duty in cases 
for which there is no precedent entail policy decisions and value judgments which ‗shape 
and, at times, refashion the common law [and] must reflect the wishes, often unspoken, 
and the perceptions, often dimly discerned, of the people. . . . What is in effect required is 
that, not merely the interests of the parties inter se, but also the conflicting interests of the 
community, be carefully weighed and that a balance be struck in accordance with what 
the court conceives to be society’s notions of what justice demands. 
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of this contribution is borne out by the decision in Van Rooyen v. Van 
Rooyen
25
 as will be discussed infra. 
 
D.  Van Rooyen v. Van Rooyen 
 
In Van Rooyen the mother of two children born from her marriage to 
the father of the children, and which marriage had been dissolved by a 
decree of divorce which incorporated an order that the father was to have 
custody of the children, applied for an order defining her rights of access 
to the children. The sole issue before the court revolved around the 
mother‘s involvement in a lesbian relationship and sharing a house and 
bedroom with a same-sex partner. 
Holding that the application turned on the question of what was in 
the best interests of the two children,
26
 the court conveyed that, ―What 
the experts say is to me so self-evident that, even without them, I believe 
that any right-thinking person would say that it is important that the 
children stay away from confusing signals as to how the sexuality of 
male and female should develop.‖27 
Against this background, the court argues that the mother can live in 
whatever way she likes, but insofar as the interests of the children require 
it, she must make a choice between persisting in lesbian activity and 
having access on a more broadly defined basis. The choice regarding her 
bedroom life, the court decides, is hers, but she cannot make a choice 
that limits what should appropriately be done in regard to children.
28
 
From this point of departure, the court argues that 
 
[a]t an age where these children soon become 12, 13, 14, they are very 
quick to pick up the signals of a separate class of male or female 
typing. The signals are given by the fact that the children know that, 
 
 1995 (2) SA 1 (A) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). In Sasfin v Beukes the court explains that, ―judges are 
more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders of what is called public policy,‖ but 
that it is nevertheless still left to the courts to determine whether a contract is contrary to public 
policy. 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) (S. Afr.). It then proceeds to explain that  
 
one must be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy because its 
terms . . . offend one‘s individual sense of propriety and fairness . . . the doctrine should 
only be invoked in clear cases in which the harm to the public is substantially 
incontestable, and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial 
minds.  
 
Id. 
 25. 1994 (2) SA 325 (WLD) (S. Afr.). 
 26. Id. at 326 B. 
 27. Id. at 328 J (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. at 329 F. 
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contrary to what they should be taught as normal or what they should 
be guided to as to be correct (that it is male and female who share a 
bed), one finds two females doing this and not obviously for reasons of 
lack of space on a particular night but as a matter of preference and a 
matter of mutual emotional attachment. That signal comes from the fact 
that they know the bedroom is shared. It is detrimental to the child 
because it is the wrong signal. The wrong signals are given when . . . 
there are signs of emotional attachment.
29
 
 
The decision in Van Rooyen has been criticized severely.
30
 It is 
argued that the court in casu had made a moral judgment about what was 
normal and correct insofar as sexuality was concerned. Furthermore, 
there can be no doubt that the court regarded homosexuality as being 
abnormal per se.
31
 Bearing in mind that the decision was given before the 
Interim Constitution came into force, it is clear that the court‘s a priori 
deduction from general principles, which it considered to reflect the boni 
mores, led to this conclusion. It goes without saying, therefore, that the 
criticism leveled against the pre-1994 dispensation—that the convictions 
of male, Calvinist middle-aged judges sometimes dictated the very 
essence of the mores—indeed holds true. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29. Id. at 330 A–C (emphasis added). 
 30. The common law definition of marriage in South Africa for many years reflected the only 
legally recognized family form in South Africa. The institution of marriage carried with it a plethora 
of legal rights and obligations. It was (and still is) regarded as the cornerstone of society—a fixed 
traditional structure essential for the raising of children and a healthy family. In fact, marriage has 
enjoyed a uniquely privileged status. However, the argument has been made that lawmakers should 
abandon what has been described as ―archaic, moralistic rules‖ so as to provide legal recognition to 
other forms of relationships. See SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PROJECT 118: 
REPORT ON DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 5 (2006), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports 
/r_prj118_2006march.pdf. 
 31. Belinda van Heerden, Judicial Interference with Parental Power, in BOBERG‘S LAW OF 
PERSONS AND THE FAMILY 545 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining that in the absence of any empirical 
evidence to support the conclusion that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are exposed to any 
greater dangers or are more likely to suffer from psychiatric, social, gender-identity, or other 
disorders than children raised by heterosexual parents in comparable circumstances, this judgment 
smacks of blatant homophobia). This viewpoint has been echoed by a number of authors. See id. at 
n.173. 
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III.  THE POST-1994 PERIOD—CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND 
NORMS RELATING TO GAY/LESBIAN PARENTS AND CHILDREN RELATED 
TO THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
As referred to in Part I, the new constitutional dispensation begun in 
1994 radically impacted legal development in South Africa.
32
 The new 
constitutional dispensation deviated from the pre-constitutional era 
where Christianity and the world-view of the Afrikaner were favored. 
 
 South Africa is an open and democratic society with a non-sectarian 
state that guarantees freedom of worship; it is respectful of, and 
accommodatory towards, rather than hostile to or walled-off from, 
religion; acknowledges the multi-faith and multi-belief nature of the 
country; does not favour one religious creed or doctrinal truth above 
another; accepts the intensely personal nature of individual conscience 
and affirms the intrinsically voluntary and non-coerced character of 
belief; respects the rights of non-believers; and does not impose 
orthodoxies of thought or require conformity of conduct in terms of any 
particular world-view. The Constitution, then, is very much about the 
acknowledgement by the State of different belief systems and their 
accommodation within a non-hierarchical framework of equality and 
non-discrimination.
33
 
 
To illustrate the impact of the Constitution on the legal position of 
gay/lesbian couples and their children in South Africa, a general 
overview of constitutional principles and provisions will be given. 
Thereafter, the focus will fall on the progress of the debate with specific 
reference to the Constitutional Court‘s viewpoints on the subject. 
 
B.  The Constitutional Grundnorm 
 
The Grundnorm of the Constitution—the basic norm which, in the 
case of a discrepancy between different constitutional interests, will 
override any other constitutional provision that comes into conflict with 
it—is a product of the country‘s past. It is constituted by the equal 
protection and non-discrimination provisions in the Constitution. The 
provision that South Africa is to be an open and democratic society based 
 
 32. See discussion supra Part I, ¶ 1. 
 33. S v Lawrence 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) at para 151 (S. Afr.). 
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on human dignity, equality, and freedom, makes it clear that in the case 
of a conflict of constitutional interests, human dignity and equality will 
be the primary considerations.
34
 
The provisions regarding equal protection and non-discrimination are 
found in section 9 of the Constitution. Amongst others, these provisions 
prohibit unfair discrimination on grounds of race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language, and birth. The legislature is also tasked to enact 
national legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
Discrimination on one or more of the grounds set out above will be 
considered unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
Broadly speaking, it would appear that the constitutional position 
regarding discrimination reflects a teleological approach—the purpose of 
differentiating between categories must dictate the ethical propriety of 
the basis employed to differentiate between such categories. In other 
words, the ―basis of the classification of groups of persons for the 
purpose of differentiating in law between these categories must be truly 
relevant with a view to the legal purpose to be served by the 
classification.‖35 Equal protection, therefore, does not per se mean actual 
equality in the arithmetical sense that would negate all differentiation 
between categories of people. If the classification is founded on a 
reasonable basis, and it is truly relevant to the purpose it is meant to 
serve, classification and differentiation for purposes of law may well fall 
within a definition of equal treatment. Of course, practicality and legal 
certainty must also prevail. 
 
C.  The Application of the Constitution 
 
The constitutional provisions that have a direct bearing on the 
position of homosexuals are sections 8, 9, 39 and 36. Sections 28(1)(b), 
28(1)(c), and 28(2) relate to the constitutional protection of children‘s 
rights and will be considered below. 
 
1.  Section 8 read with section 39(2)—application of constitutional 
norms and principles 
 
From the provisions of section 8(1), it is clear that the Bill of Rights, 
true to nature, binds all organs of state. The sub-section reads that the 
Bill ―applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
 
 34. See S v Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.); Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 
283. 
 35. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 289. 
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judiciary and all organs of state.‖36 As this provision is self-explanatory, 
no further attention will be paid to it except to indicate that ―law‖ in 
these sections is to be interpreted broadly. What is designated by this 
provision, therefore, is that ―law‖ means positive law which includes 
statutory law, common law and customary law in contradistinction to 
where law is simply translated as ―Act‖ (“wet”).37 
Sections 8(2) and 8(3) also provide for the application of the Bill in 
the sphere of private law issues. As such, the phraseology in which the 
horizontal application of provisions of the Bill is couched is juxtaposed 
with the developmental function of the court in respect of the common 
law. Section 8(2) and 8(3) provides as follows in this regard: 
 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person 
if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature 
of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or 
juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court— 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if 
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does 
not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided 
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).
38
 
 
These sub-sections apply to all instances where the regulatory law, 
which either affords legality to the decision taken or act performed or 
which prohibits such conduct through private law proscriptions or 
sanctions, is part of the common law. A court is therefore obligated to 
 
 36. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 8(1). 
 37. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 268 n.23. 
 38. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 8(2)–(3). It is clear that in contradistinction to section 8(1), 
natural and juristic persons are only bound by the Bill of Rights to the extent that a provision of the 
Bill is applicable in view of the nature of the right and the duty imposed. Questions concerning the 
horizontal application of the Bill can therefore not be determined a priori and in the abstract. In fact, 
from the very wording of section 8(3) it appears that whether a provision of the Bill applies 
horizontally will depend on the nature of the private conduct in question and the circumstances of 
the particular case. The extent to which a provision is applicable can only be determined by 
reference to the context within which it is sought to be relied upon. If, however, the provisions of 
section 8(2) do find application, the duty to uphold, endure or execute the right vests in a natural or 
juristic person; similar to the position with regard to organs within the State structure as set out in 
section 8(1). 
  The purpose of a provision is an important consideration to determine whether it is 
applicable to private conduct or not. By the same token, the nature of any duty imposed by the right 
must also be taken into account. Private or juristic persons are often driven primarily by a concern 
for themselves while the State, on the other hand, should rather be motivated by a concern for the 
well-being of society as a whole. The application of the Bill should therefore not undermine private 
autonomy to the same extent that it places restrictions on the sovereignty of parliament. 
  
383] RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 395 
consider the permissive or proscriptive rule applicable to conduct of the 
duty-bound person with two primary questions in mind: Does the 
concerned rule of the common law in any way frustrate the 
constitutionally protected right implicated by the decision or act of the 
duty bound subject? Does the concerned rule of the common law permit 
limitations of the constitutionally protected right which do not comply 
with the demands of the limitations provision of the Constitution? 
If the answer to either of these questions is yes, a court has an 
obligation to ―develop‖ the common law in order to give effect to the 
constitutionally protected right and/or to bring the limitation of that right 
as sanctioned by the common law in conformity with the limitation 
demands of the Constitution.
39
 It is also clear that development of the 
 
 39. The form of application in section 8(2) reflects the so-called indirect application of the 
Bill of Rights. In this instance a dispute is resolved by interpreting a statute or developing the 
common law so as to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill through the operation of 
ordinary law. When the Bill is directly applied, however, the question is whether there is any 
inconsistency between the Bill and the law or conduct in question.  If so, such law or conduct 
unjustifiably violates the Bill and a remedy provided for by the Constitution will be given to the 
applicant. See DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 167. 
  Remedies flowing from a direct application of the Bill to law and conduct are provided 
for in sections 38, 172(1), 8(3) and 39(2). These sections provide as follows:  
Section 38: Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging   that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate 
relief, including a declaration of rights.  
Section 172(1): When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –  
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and  
(b) may make an order that is just and equitable, including –  
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and  
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.  
Section 8(3) has been referred to already. See supra text accompanying note 37.  
Section 39(2): When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights. (See infra text accompanying note 42.)  
Prima facie there appears to be an overlap between the provisions of sections 39(2) and 8(3). On 
closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that there is a marked difference in the sense that section 8(3) 
establishes a law creating power, whereas the competence vested in a court by s 39(2) in regard to 
the common law is one of applying its normal power of interpretation in favorum libertatis with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution as a substantive directive. See Van der Vyver, supra 
note 3, at 274. Van der Vyver warns, though, that the distinction between law creation in terms of 
section 8(3) and development through interpretation pursuant to section 39(2) is difficult to define 
with any degree of precision. The language of section 8(3) indicates the power of the court to add to 
the common law provisions that would afford protection of constitutionally defined rights which the 
common law as such would otherwise not have provided. It furthermore adds to the common law 
limitations of constitutionally protected rights in their application to natural and juristic persons 
which will conform with the limitation provisions of the Constitution in all instances where the 
common law confinement of such rights falls short of the constitutional limitation conditions and 
requirements. 
  The provisions of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution should also be borne in mind. 
This section provides that the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status 
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common law in terms of section 8(2) entitles a court to read 
constitutional rights into the common law which the common law would 
otherwise not have protected.
40
 The court may also rewrite common law 
limitations pertaining to a particular right which is now also protected by 
the Constitution so as to equate those limitations with the constitutional 
conditions for, and requirements of, such limitations.
41
 
Section 39(1) and (2) must be read in conjunction with sections 8(2) 
and (3). These subsections determine as follows: 
 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie a democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
 (b)  must consider international law; and 
 (c)  may consider foreign law. 
(2)  When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the  
   common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum   
 
may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament. However, such an 
order will have no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court. 
 40. Petersen v Maintenance Officer, Simon‘s Town Maintenance Court 2004 (2) SA 56 (C) 
(S. Afr.); Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.); Carmichele v Minister of Safety & 
Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 41. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 271. Van der Vyver points out that courts are given law-
creating powers which by far exceed those exercised previously by the High Court in respect of the 
common law. The fact that implementation of section 8(3) powers amounts to the courts usurping 
the function of the legislature and as such violates the separation of powers, which constitutes a 
salient component of the new constitutional dispensation is, however, of no relevance after the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in In re Certification of the Amended text of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 1 BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). See supra note 1.  Having 
endorsed the revised Constitution, the Constitutional Court afforded incontestable sanction to these 
powers. It is furthermore important to note that whereas in the past principles of natural justice 
served as a criterion of the judicial developmental function, the courts must now look to the 
Constitution to find the norm of rights protection, and of the limitation of rights that must be 
incorporated into the common law. 
  It has been held in a number of cases, however, that in exercising their powers to develop 
the common law, judges should be mindful of the fact that the major engine for law reform should 
be the legislature and not the judiciary. In Du Plessis v De Klerk, the court held that 
 
Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and 
economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose 
social foundation has long since disappeared. Nonetheless there are significant 
constraints on the power of the Judiciary to change the law. . . . In a constitutional 
democracy such as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which has the major 
responsibility for law reform. . . . The Judiciary should confine itself to those incremental 
changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and 
evolving fabric of our society. 
 
1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at para 61 (S. Afr.) (quoting R. v Salituro 1992 (8) C.R.R. 173); see also 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para 36 (S. Afr.); Petersen v Maint. 
Officer, Simon‘s Town Maint. Ct. 2004 (2) SA 56 (CPD) (S. Afr.). 
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   must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Section 173 of the Constitution provides that all higher courts have 
the inherent power to develop the common law, taking into account the 
interests of justice. All courts are obliged to promote the spirit, purport, 
and object of the Bill of Rights when developing the common law. It 
follows implicitly, therefore, that where the common law deviates from 
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill, the courts have an obligation to 
develop it by removing that deviation. The obligation of courts to 
develop the common law is not purely discretionary. On the contrary, the 
reading together of these two sections conveys that where the common 
law, as it stands, is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, 
courts are under a general obligation to develop it appropriately. 
However, while ―general obligation‖ does not mean per se that a court 
must in each and every case where the common law is involved embark 
on an independent exercise to determine whether the common law is in 
need of development and, if so, how it is to be developed under section 
39(2), it may happen that there may be circumstances where a court will 
be obliged to raise the matter on its own and require full argument from 
the parties.
42
 Where the common law has to be developed beyond 
existing precedent, there are two stages to the inquiry the court has to 
undertake, even though they cannot be separated hermetically. First, the 
court must consider whether the existing common law requires 
development in accordance with the objectives of section 39(2). Should 
this inquiry lead to a positive answer, the second stage concerns itself 
with how such development is to take place in order to meet the section 
39(2) objectives.
43
 
The prescripts of the common law as interpreted in Van Rooyen 
clearly conflict with section 8 and 39(2), which enact the constitutional 
obligation of South African courts to develop the common law with 
regard to homosexual persons so as to bring it in line with the provisions 
of the Constitution. While the Constitution‘s status as the supreme source 
of the mores of the community is confirmed by these provisions, courts 
are entrusted with the task of interpreting constitutional values and 
applying such values to develop the common law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 42. Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para 39 (S. Afr.). 
 43. See cases cited supra note 38. 
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2.  Section 9—the equality clause 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution entails the so-called equality clause. In 
terms of this provision, everyone is equal before the law and has the right 
to equal protection and benefit of the law. Equality includes the full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. However, to promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons (or categories of persons) disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination may be taken. The state is therefore forbidden to 
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on a number of 
grounds set out in section 9(3). These include, inter alia, sex and sexual 
orientation. Private persons are also forbidden to discriminate unfairly on 
these grounds. In terms of section 9(5), discrimination on one of the 
grounds will be deemed unfair unless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair.
44
 
In Harksen v Lane NO,
45
 the Constitutional Court set out the stages 
of an inquiry into a violation of the equality clause: 
 
(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of 
people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a 
legitimate government purpose? If it does not then there is a violation 
of s 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might 
nevertheless amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This 
 
 44. It is clear that a distinction must be drawn between substantive and formal equality. 
Formal equality would simply mean that all persons are equal bearers of rights—that the law must 
treat individuals in the same manner irrespective of their circumstances; a so-called neutral 
norm/standard of measurement. Substantive equality on the other hand, takes the personal 
circumstances into account and requires the law to ensure quality of outcome. This form of equality 
requires an examination of the actual social and economic conditions of groups and individuals in 
order to determine whether the Constitution‘s commitment to equality is being upheld. It goes 
without saying that a purely formal understanding of equality would risk neglecting the deepest 
commitments of the Constitution. A substantive conception of equality would, in contradistinction, 
be supportive of these fundamental values. In President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Hugo, the 
Constitutional Court indicates a clear preference for substantive equality: 
 
We . . . need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognizes that although 
a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth 
and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment 
in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, will require a 
careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the 
particular people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers 
the constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one context 
may not necessarily be unfair in a different context. 
 
1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 41 (S. Afr.). 
 45. 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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requires a two stage analysis: 
(b)(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ―discrimination?‖ If it 
is on a specified ground, then discrimination will have been 
established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there 
is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is 
based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to 
impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to 
affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
(b)(ii) If the differentiation amounts to ―discrimination,‖ does it amount 
to ―unfair discrimination?‖ If it has been found to have been on a 
specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an 
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the 
complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of 
the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. 
If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not 
to be unfair, then there will be no violation of section 8(2). [now 
sections 9(3) and 9(4)] 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will 
have to be made as to whether the provisions can be justified under the 
limitations clause.
46
 
 
In essence, the criterion set out above means that there is a 
preliminary inquiry as to whether the impugned provision or conduct 
differentiates between people or categories of people. Of course, if there 
is no differentiation, there is no question of a violation of the provisions 
of section 9. However, if a provision does differentiate, a two-stage 
analysis must be applied. The first stage ((a) above) concerns the right to 
equal treatment and equality before the law and aims at determining 
whether the provision has a rational basis—if there is a rational 
connection between the differentiation in question and a legitimate state 
purpose that it is designed to further or achieve. If the conclusion is 
negative, the impugned provision violates section 9 and fails the first 
stage. If, on the other hand, the differentiation is shown to be rational, the 
second stage of the enquiry ((b) above) is activated. A differentiation that 
is rational may, however, constitute unfair discrimination when such 
differentiation relates to the specific grounds on which it is forbidden to 
discriminate unfairly. In principle, both unfair discrimination and 
differentiation without a rational basis can then in terms of section 36
47
 
be justified as limitations of the right to equality.
48
 
 
 46. Id. at paras. 41–53. 
 47. See accompanying text supra note 47. 
 48. DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 1, at ch. 7. 
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3.  Section 36—the limitation of constitutionally protected rights 
 
Section 36(2) provides that a limitation of a constitutionally 
protected right must comply with the prescriptions of section 36(1) or 
with the dictates of any other provision of the Constitution. In terms of 
section 36(1) the limitation of a constitutionally protected right must 
adhere to the following requirements: the limitation must be sanctioned 
by law of general application; the limitation must be reasonable; the 
limitation must be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account all relevant 
factors, including the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of 
the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose, and also less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose. It is to be noted that ―law of general application‖ 
reflects a broad definition of law, including limitations sanctioned by 
statutory provisions and the common law.
49
 The requirement of 
reasonableness was held to mean that ―a law or action limiting a right to 
freedom must have a reasonable goal and the means for achieving that 
goal must be reasonable.‖50 
The further qualification that limitations of a fundamental right must 
be justifiable in an open and democratic society clearly envisages a 
society that differs fundamentally from the one associated with apartheid 
South Africa. In fact, the true nature of this requirement only comes to 
the fore when cognizance is taken of the provisions of section 7(1), 
which in essence elevate the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality, and freedom to the status of being the ultimate normative 
sources of the rights enshrined in the Bill; and of section 39(1), which 
compels a court to promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom when 
interpreting the Bill.
51
 
The structure of the inquiry as set out above appears to be quite 
systematic—one first considers whether there has been a violation of the 
 
 49. Van der Vyver, supra note 3, at 277. 
 50. See Coetzee v Gov‘t of the Republic of S. Afr. 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 51. In Coetzee v Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr., the Constitutional Court held that ―[w]e 
need to locate ourselves in the mainstream of international practice‖ to establish what is meant by 
this requirement. 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) at para 51 (S. Afr.). It is furthermore illuminating to bear the 
Preamble of the Constitution in mind. Specific reference is made to the motivation for the 
Constitution qua supreme law of the country to achieve the following: (1) Heal the divisions of the 
past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights; (2) Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on 
the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; (3) Improve the quality of life of 
all citizens and free the potential of each person; and (4) Build a united and democratic South Africa 
to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations. 
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right to equality before the law and then considers whether there is unfair 
discrimination. If the right to equal treatment has been violated there will 
be no need to consider whether there has been a violation of the non-
discrimination right.
52
 
 
D.  The Interpretation of the Constitutional Principles with Regard to 
Homosexual Relationships 
 
The societal approach towards homosexuality is progressively 
changing. This is reflected in jurisprudence in which constitutional 
norms and values are applied to the issue of homosexuality. In a number 
of cases relating to the crime of sodomy, the courts reflected on the 
changed mores in clear terms . In S v M the court held that ―the majority 
of people who have normal heterosexual relationships, may find acts of 
sodomy unacceptable and reprehensible. We cannot close our eyes, 
however, to the fact that society accepts that there are individuals who 
have homosexual tendencies and who form intimate relationships with 
those of their own sex.‖53  In S v H the court was very critical of the 
phrase ―normal heterosexual relationship‖ as employed in S v M on the 
basis that it ―implies that homosexual relationships are abnormal in a 
sense other than the mere fact that they are statistically in the minority.‖54 
The court then proceeds as follows: 
 
In my respectful view the use of the word ―normal‖ in this context is 
unfortunate, as it might suggest a prejudgment of much current 
psychological and sociological opinion which is critical of various 
conventions and assumptions regarding human sexuality. It may also 
suggest a wrong line of enquiry when coming to re-evaluate the status 
of homosexual relationships. I would suggest that a more fruitful legal 
enquiry might be directed at concepts of privacy and autonomy and the 
issue whether private intimacy per se between consenting adult males 
can ever cause harm to society any more than private heterosexual 
intimacy between consenting adults.
55
 
 
 
 52. See, e.g., National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (6) 
BCLR 726 (W) (S. Afr.). In this case the court held that it need not inevitably perform both stages of 
the enquiry. This was because the first-stage rational basis inquiry would be unnecessary in a case in 
which the court holds that the discrimination is unfair and unjustifiable.  This simply means that in 
those cases in which a court finds that a law or conduct unjustifiably infringes sections 9(3) or 9(4) 
there is no need to consider whether the law or conduct is in violation of section 9(1). 
 53. 1990 (2) SACR 509 (E) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 54. 1995 (1) SA 120 (C) at 124C (S. Afr.). 
 55. Id. at 124E. 
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The court further accepts with approval the approach followed in Bowers 
v Hardwick,
56
 which held that the assertion that traditional Judeo-
Christian values proscribed particular conduct could not provide an 
adequate justification for certain statutory enactments. The state had no 
license to impose the judgments of religious groups that condemned the 
behavior at issue on the entire citizenry. The court in casu further 
conveyed that the legitimacy of secular legislation rather depended on 
whether the state could justify its law beyond its conformity to religious 
doctrine. 
In Brink v Kitshoff the court decided that section 8 was adopted to 
recognize that discrimination against people who were 
 
members of disfavored groups could lead to patterns of group 
disadvantage and harm, and that such discrimination would be unfair in 
the sense that it would build and entrench inequality amongst different 
groups in the South African society. The drafters of the Constitution 
realized that it was necessary both to proscribe such forms of 
discrimination and to permit positive steps to redress the effects of such 
discrimination.
57
 
 
Against this background it was held in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice
58
 that the desire for equality is not 
a hope for the elimination of all differences. However, ―the experience of 
subordination—of personal subordination, above all—lies behind the 
vision of equality.‖ To understand ―the other,‖ the court held, one must 
try as far as is humanly possible to place oneself in the position of ―the 
other.‖ The court stressed that the determining factor regarding 
unfairness of discrimination is the impact of the discrimination on the 
members of the affected group.
59
 
 
 56. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 57. 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 58. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.) . 
 59. The approach to this determination is a nuanced and comprehensive one in which various 
factors come into play which, when assessed cumulatively and objectively, will assist in elaborating 
and giving precision to the constitutional test of unfairness. Important factors to be assessed in this 
regard (which do not constitute a closed list) are: (1) The position of complainants in society and 
whether they have suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage. (2) The nature of the provision 
or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it.  If its purpose is manifestly not directed, in the 
first instance, at impairing the complainants in their fundamental human dignity or in a comparably 
serious respect, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal as . . . the furthering 
of equality for all, this purpose may, depending on the facts of the particular case, have a significant 
bearing on the question whether complainants have in fact suffered the impairment in question. (3) 
With due regard to (1) and (2) above, and any other relevant factors, the extent to which the 
discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and whether it has led to an 
impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably 
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The progressive approach regarding sodomy as set out above is also 
reflected in a number of cases relating to the consequences pertaining to 
gay/lesbian relationships. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs, the court referred to the changing 
mores as affirmed in the so-called sodomy cases and moved on to the 
nature of same-sex relationships.
60
 It stated that the sting of the 
discrimination against gays and lesbians is reflected in the message that 
it conveys that they, whether viewed as individuals or in their same-sex 
relationships, do not have inherent dignity and are not worthy of the 
human respect possessed by and accorded to heterosexuals in their 
relationships. 
 
This discrimination occurs at a deeply intimate level of human 
existence and relationality. It denies to gays and lesbians that which is 
foundational to our Constitution and the concepts of equality and 
dignity, which at this point are closely intertwined, namely that all 
persons have the same inherent worth and dignity as human beings, 
whatever their other differences may be. The denial of equal dignity 
and worth to all too quickly and insidiously degenerates into a denial of 
humanity and leads to inhuman treatment by the rest of society in other 
ways. This is deeply demeaning and frequently has the cruel effect of 
undermining the confidence and sense of self-worth and self-respect of 
lesbians and gays.
61
 
 
Against this background, the court concludes that a statutory 
enactment exempting ―spouses,‖ and not partners, in a permanent same-
sex relationship from certain statutory provisions is discriminatory 
against such partners. Accepting that the provision in casu was aimed at 
achieving the societal goal of protecting the family life of ―lawful 
marriages,‖ the court considers the impact of being excluded from these 
protective provisions of same-sex partners.
62
 In its deliberations, the 
court conveys that marriage creates a consortium omnis vitae, ―a 
physical, moral, and spiritual community of life,‖ and that ―over the past 
 
serious nature. See Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 
para 19 (S. Afr.). 
 60. 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para 41 (S. Afr.). 
 61. Id. at para 42. 
 62. In casu the decision dealt with section 25 of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991. An 
application was brought for an order declaring this article to be inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution on the basis that it discriminated against partners in a same-sex relationship, in that 
section 25(5) of the Act provided for an exemption from the provisions of section 25(4) for a spouse 
of a person permanently and lawfully resident in South Africa. By implication this exemption did not 
extend to partners in same-sex life partnerships. 
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decades an accelerating process of transformation has taken place in 
family relationships, as well as in societal and legal concepts regarding 
the family and what it comprises. The impact of the failure in the statute 
to also exempt partners in a same-sex relationship is therefore to 
reinforce harmful and hurtful stereotypes of gays and lesbians.‖63 
Section 10 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees that 
everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have his or her dignity 
respected and protected. The court therefore comes to the following 
conclusion: 
 
[G]ays and lesbians have a constitutionally entrenched right to dignity 
and equality; sexual orientation is a ground expressly listed in section 
9(3) of the Constitution and under section 9(5) discrimination on this 
ground is unfair unless the contrary is established; prior criminal 
proscription of private and consensual sexual expression between gays 
arising from their sexual orientation and which had been directed at gay 
men, has been struck down as unconstitutional; gays and lesbians in 
same-sex life partnerships are as capable as heterosexual spouses of 
expressing and sharing love in its manifold forms, including affection, 
friendship, eros and charity; they are likewise as capable of forming 
intimate, permanent, committed, monogamous, loyal and enduring 
relationships; of furnishing emotional and spiritual support; and of 
providing physical care, financial support and assistance in running the 
common household; they are individually able to adopt children and in 
the case of lesbians, to bear them; in short, they have the same ability to 
establish a consortium omnis vitae; and finally, they are capable of 
constituting a family, whether nuclear or extended, and of establishing, 
enjoying, and benefiting from family life which is not distinguishable 
in any significant respect from that of heterosexual spouses.
64
 
 
 
 63. The court refers to two typical arguments that bolster the prejudice against gay and 
lesbian sexuality.  In the first place, gays and lesbians are classified as exclusively sexual beings 
(compared to perception of heterosexual people who, along with many other activities in their lives, 
occasionally engage in sex). In the second place, the argument is found that gays and lesbians cannot 
procreate in the same way as heterosexual people and therefore should not be allowed to adopt 
children. In this regard the Court points out that gays and lesbians are indeed individually permitted 
to adopt children in terms of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 and that nothing prevents a gay or 
lesbian couple, a partner of which has adopted a child, from treating such child in all ways, other 
than strictly legally, as their child. They can indeed love, care, and provide for the child as though it 
was their joint child. Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 
1 (CC) at paras. 49–50 (S. Afr.); see also cases cited infra note 86. 
 64. Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at 
para 50 (S. Afr.). 
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The rights to equality and dignity go to the core of the constitutional 
democratic values of human dignity, equality, and freedom. The forming 
and sustaining of intimate personal relationships in same-sex fashion are 
for many individuals essential for their own self-understanding and for 
the full development and expression of their human personalities. The 
omission of such partnerships in the present case is therefore found to 
limit the right to enter into a permanent personal relationship with 
another at a deep and serious level.
65
 
 
IV.  THE APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND 
NORMS TO GAY/LESBIAN PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 
 
A.  Recognition of New Family Structures 
 
The concept of family has undergone major changes in view of 
constitutional principles and norms. An accelerating process of 
transformation has taken place in family relationships, as well as in the 
societal and legal concepts regarding the family and what it comprises.
66
 
This observation is borne out by the following argument of the 
Constitutional Court in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs: 
 
The importance of the family unit for society is recognized in the 
international human rights instruments . . . when they state that the 
family is the ―natural‖ and ―fundamental‖ unit of our society. However, 
families come in different shapes and sizes. The definition of the family 
also changes as social practices and traditions change. In recognizing 
the importance of the family, we must take care not to entrench 
particular forms of family at the expense of other forms.
67
 
 
The decision in Dawood hardly comes as a surprise. In fact, one can 
describe it as a logical conclusion of a line of reasoning that has been 
developing over the last decade. The founders of the Constitution 
deliberately refrained from including a provision recognizing the family 
as the basic unit of society. In In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the RSA the Constitutional Court explained that a survey of international 
instruments conveyed that in general, states have a duty, in terms of 
international human rights law, to protect the rights of persons to marry 
freely and to raise a family.
68
 The duty on states to protect marriage and 
 
 65. Id. at para 58. 
 66. Id. at para 47. 
 67. 2000 (3) SA 936  (CC) at para 31 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 68. 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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family life has been interpreted in a multitude of different ways. By no 
means has there been universal acceptance of the need to recognize the 
rights to marriage and to family life as being fundamental in the sense 
that they require express constitutional protection.
69
 The court then 
proceeded to explain that the absence of marriage and family rights in 
many African and Asian countries reflects the multi-cultural and multi-
faith character of such societies. 
 
Families are constituted, function and are dissolved in such a variety of 
ways, and the possible outcomes of constitutionalising family rights are 
so uncertain, that constitution-makers appear frequently to prefer not to 
regard the right to marry or to pursue family life as a fundamental right 
that is appropriate for definition in constitutionalised terms. They 
thereby avoid disagreements over whether the family to be protected is 
a nuclear family or an extended family, or over which ceremonies, rites 
or practices would constitute a marriage deserving of constitutional 
protection. . . . These are seen as questions that relate to the history, 
culture and special circumstances of each society, permitting of no 
universal solutions.
70
 
 
It is also clear from the decision that the Constitutional Court 
refrained from providing a definition of a family. In its views of the 
nature of gay/lesbian relationships the Constitutional Court has also 
made it clear that from a legal and constitutional point of view 
procreative potential is not a defining characteristic of conjugal 
relationships. It was held in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs
71
 that a view to the contrary would 
be deeply demeaning to couples (whether married or not) who, for 
whatever reason, are incapable of procreating when they commence their 
relationship or become so anytime thereafter. It is likewise demeaning to 
couples who commence such a relationship at an age when they no 
longer have the desire for sexual relations. It may even be demeaning to 
a couple who voluntarily decides not to have children or sexual relations 
with one another; this decision is entirely within their protected sphere of 
freedom and privacy. 
The approach of the Constitutional Court has served as the basis for 
a number of decisions radically deviating from the approach in Van 
Rooyen. In Ex Parte Critchfield the court concluded that 
 
 
 69. Id. para. 98. 
 70. Id. para. 99. 
 71. 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para. 51 (S. Afr.). 
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[i]n a society such as ours which proscribes discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, these encounters can be viewed in no more 
serious a light than conventional adultery. . . . [I]n my view, the Court 
should not be particularly concerned with the sexual predilections of 
litigants when it comes to custody matters. It encourages a voyeurism 
in public life that demeans us all. It is an entirely different matter where 
such predilections pose an actual or potential threat to the welfare, 
psychological or physical, of young children.
72
 
 
In V v V it was found that the court in Van Rooyen had made a moral 
judgment about what was normal and correct with regard to sexuality 
and about homosexuality, which it found to be abnormal per se.
73
 
Referring to the limitations allowed by the Constitution on fundamental 
rights, the court explains that there may well be situations where a court 
will override the equality clause in the best interests of the child, but it 
would then consider the reasonableness of such limitations. The court 
concluded, therefore, that an order by a court discriminating against a 
lesbian mother who applies for access rights to her children that is based 
solely on her sexual orientation will not easily pass constitutional muster. 
In the same way a court cannot take cognizance of racism or religious 
intolerance when it decides on the access of the mother to her children, it 
cannot take cognizance of prejudice in the society. To do that would be 
to unreasonably limit, or perhaps even negate, the essential content of the 
right not to be discriminated against on the ground of sexual orientation. 
The Constitution ―does allow for fundamental rights to be limited by 
law of general application where the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality, and where it does not negate the essential content of the 
right.‖74 While it is clear that ―currently existing bigotry and its 
consequences [does not in itself] create a valid reason to limit the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of a gay or lesbian parent,‖ it is 
 
equally clear that while the child is growing up there may be strong 
recrimination from peers and other parents against such child when it 
becomes known that his or her parent is gay or lesbian. The child may 
also become confused by the parent‘s unwillingness to conform to a 
generally accepted norm. There is in terms of the equality clause indeed 
nothing abnormal or wrong about a homosexual relationship, but it may 
be in the best interests of a child to discriminate against its homosexual 
 
 72. 1999 (3) SA 132 (W) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 73. 1998 (4) SA 169 (C) (S. Afr.). 
 74. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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parent if that would be the only way in which the child would be spared 
unnecessary suffering.
75
 
 
B.  Evaluation of South African Jurisprudence Relating to Lesbigay 
Parents and Children 
 
One can discern three different standards for how the homosexuality 
of a parent should be applied by a court in respect of lesbigay parents and 
children. The first standard is the so-called per se approach. This 
standard generally holds that a homosexual parent is unfit as a matter of 
law. The court does not have to consider any factors concerning the 
child‘s best interests, but can categorically deny custody to the 
homosexual parent. The second standard is the presumption of harm or 
middle ground approach. In determining the fitness of the homosexual 
parent, the court following this approach will conclude that declaring a 
lesbian mother unfit as a matter of law is improper, and that other factors 
affecting the best interests of the child must also be considered. 
However, even though the parent is not per se considered to be an unfit 
parent, the court presumes that the child will suffer because of the social 
stigma attached to the parent‘s homosexuality. This approach condemns 
the homosexual conduct but not the homosexual person. Applying this 
approach, a court may find a homosexual parent unfit because the social 
stigma attached to homosexuality may be detrimental to the child. 
Consequently, the court will often forbid the child to have contact with 
the parent‘s homosexual lifestyle.76 The third standard is the nexus 
approach. This approach resolves many of the problems of the first 
mentioned standards and takes a parent‘s sexual preference into 
consideration as only one of many factors. Homosexuality will only be 
held against a parent if there is a nexus between the parent‘s sexual 
preference and the possible harmful effects on the child. The application 
of this standard requires that the homosexuality of a parent has an 
adverse effect on the child before it may be taken into account. The 
nexus standard does not consider homosexuality by itself or the 
homosexual behavior as a valid consideration for denying custody; it 
only considers the parent‘s sexual orientation when it has an adverse 
effect on the child‘s best interests.77 It needs no elaboration that the per 
 
 75. Pierre De Vos, The Right of a Lesbian Mother to Have Access to Her Children: Some 
Constitutional Issues 111 S. AFR. L.J. 687, 691 (1994). 
 76. Katja M. Eichinger-Swainston, Note, Fox v. Fox: Redefining the Best Interest of the 
Child Standard for Lesbian Mothers and Their Families 32 TULSA L.J. 57 (1996); Eileen P. Huff 
The Children of Homosexual Parents: The Voices the Courts Have Yet To Hear 9 AM. U.J. GENDER 
SOC. POL‘Y & L. 695, 699 (2001). 
 77. Eichinger-Swainston, supra note 76, at 59; Huff, supra note 76, at 700. 
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se standard finds no place in the new constitutional dispensation in South 
Africa. No further attention will therefore be paid to this approach.
78
 
Van Rooyen appears to reflect a middle ground approach in that the 
court does not condemn the lesbian mother, but does condemn her 
lesbian conduct. The order of the court in terms of which the children 
may not have contact with the mother‘s lesbian lifestyle rests on this 
conclusion. The middle ground approach is also evident in the plaintiff‘s 
argument before the court in V v V
79
 and the court‘s apparent acceptance 
of the argument. The plaintiff was prepared to allow defendant (who had 
been involved in a lesbian relationship) supervised access to the children 
only. Unsupervised access was only to be granted if a psychiatrist 
certified that it was in the best interests of the children that defendant had 
access to them, and then only under the condition that no other person 
slept under the same roof (apparently referring to the mother‘s lesbian 
partner). 
The court took as its starting proposition the idea that the child‘s 
rights are paramount and need to be protected, and further, that situations 
may well arise where the best interests of the child require that action is 
taken for the benefit of the child which effectively cuts across the 
parents‘ rights. The court then appeared to take the following part of an 
article of De Vos as basis for its argument: 
 
Section 33(1) [of the Interim Constitution] allows for these rights to be 
limited by law of general application, where the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality, and where it does not negate the essential content of that right. 
 Does this mean that a more subtle justification for the same order 
would be constitutionally valid? In other words, will currently existing 
bigotry and its consequences be a valid reason to limit the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the lesbian mother? The argument 
could be formulated as follows: There is nothing inherently wrong or 
abnormal about a lesbian relationship. But while the child is growing 
up, there will be strong social recrimination from peers and other 
parents against the child as it becomes known that his or her mother is 
a lesbian. The child might also become confused and distressed by his 
or her mother‘s unwillingness to conform to a generally accepted norm. 
It might therefore be in the best interests of the child to discriminate 
against the lesbian mother, because that will be the only way in which 
 
 78. The court‘s explanation that children should be kept away from signals that are contrary 
to what is considered normal or correct may even reflect the per se standard. 
 79. 1998 (4) SA 169 (CPD) (S. Afr.). 
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her children could be spared unnecessary suffering.
80
 
 
From the court‘s reference to the Canadian decision in R v Oakes81 
that a discriminatory order against a lesbian mother in an application for 
access rights to her children that is solely based on her sexual orientation 
will not easily pass constitutional muster, it is clear that the court 
distances itself from the per se approach. The Oakes decision, however, 
elaborates on this basis, seemingly accepting the nexus standard. It states 
that in the same way that the court cannot take cognizance of racism or 
religious intolerance when it decides on the access of the mother to her 
children, it cannot take cognizance of prejudice in the society. To do that, 
the Oakes decision holds, would be to unreasonably limit, or perhaps 
even negate, the essential content of the right not to be discriminated 
against on the ground of sexual orientation. 
On the evidence before it, the court found that the children were not 
so embarrassed by the situation of their mother that it prevented them 
from having friends stay with them at their mother‘s house overnight, 
even when the mother‘s partner was there. In fact, in the opinion of the 
court the defendant was a ―good and suitable mother.‖ It may be 
concluded, therefore, that the court appeared to be vacillating between 
the nexus and middle ground approaches. The part of De Vos‘ argument 
referred to by the court falls squarely within the framework of the middle 
ground approach. Referring to Oakes without further elaboration may, 
on the other hand, be indicative of the court‘s acceptance of the nexus 
approach. 
As previously quoted, in Ex Parte Critchfield the court concluded 
that: 
 
[i]n a society such as ours which proscribes discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, these encounters can be viewed in no more 
serious a light than conventional adultery. . . . [I]n my view, the Court 
should not be particularly concerned with the sexual predilections of 
litigants when it comes to custody matters. It encourages a voyeurism 
in public life that demeans us all. It is an entirely different matter where 
such predilections pose an actual or potential threat to the welfare, 
psychological or physical, of young children.
 82
 
 
Critchfield clearly reflects the nexus standard. This standard takes 
the parent‘s homosexuality into account as one of many factors in 
 
 80. De Vos, supra note 75, at 691–92 (emphasis added). 
 81. [1986] 26 DLR 200 (Can.). 
 82. 1999 (3) SA 132 (W) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
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determining what is in the best interests of the child. The homosexuality 
of the parent will be held against him or her only if there is a clear nexus 
between his or her conduct and any harmful effects on the child. The 
court‘s remark that it should only be concerned with the sexual 
predilections of litigants when it comes to custody matters and where it 
poses an actual or potential threat to the welfare of children, bears out on 
this approach. 
 
C.  Conclusion 
 
It is suggested that the nexus standard applied in Critchfield better 
reflects the constitutional values and norms expressed by the 
Constitutional Court in the decisions regarding homosexuality and 
families as set out above. This standard does not focus on anyone‘s 
morality, but rather on the best interests of the child. Where 
homosexuality of a parent becomes an issue in litigation, the correct 
approach, it is suggested, is to establish whether there is a nexus between 
behavior that may be detrimental to the best interests of the child and the 
effect of the behavior on the child. In this way the best interests of the 
child are protected without infringing on the parent‘s sexual privacy. 
 
V.  THE APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE 
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 
 
The exposition in paragraphs III(D) and IV(A) above makes it 
abundantly clear that the Constitutional Court has acknowledged that: 
(1) the concept of family has changed to comply with modern day 
demands; 
(2) the mere fact of homosexuality does not prevent same-sex life 
partners from forming a family and that their relationship may 
establish a consortium omnis vitae; 
(3) statutory provisions prohibiting same-sex life partners from 
jointly adopting a child postulate infringements of the Constitution 
and are therefore invalid (thereby acknowledging that homosexual 
parents and adopted children may form a family in the legal sense of 
the word); 
(4) it would be unconstitutional to regard homosexuality per se as a 
ground justifying a negative attitude towards a parent in litigation 
pertaining to children—in fact, gays and lesbians can meet the 
constitutional requirements for the exercising of parental care as well 
as any heterosexual person can; and 
(5) gays and lesbians may be considered to be the primary caregivers 
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of children in their custody when living together in a family 
relationship. 
This change in attitude is borne out specifically by the decision in Du 
Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development,
83
 in which the 
court found that the status of the applicants as unmarried persons, which 
precluded them from adopting siblings jointly, was inextricably linked to 
their sexual orientation. This decision related primarily to section 17(a) 
of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983,
84
 which provides that a child can be 
adopted, inter alia, by a husband and a wife jointly; it does not provide 
for the joint adoption of children by partners in a permanent same-sex 
life partnership.
85
 The evidence before the court showed that the 
applicants who were same-sex life partners were eminently suitable to 
jointly adopt a child.
86
 They approached the High Court because of the 
Children‘s Court‘s decision to award custody and guardianship in terms 
of section 17(a) only to one applicant despite both applicants having 
been recommended jointly as suitable parents. The applicants argued that 
section 17 unfairly discriminated against gay and lesbian parents on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and marital status and that the absolute 
prohibition of joint adoptions by same-sex parents cannot be in the best 
interests of adoptive children who are placed in the families of adoptive 
parents involved in permanent same-sex life partnerships. 
The court repeatedly reiterated its recognition of the changed concept 
of the family. 
 
Recognition of the fact that many children are not brought up by their 
biological parents is embodied in s 28(1)(b) of our Constitution which 
guarantees a child‘s right to ―family care or parental care.‖ Family care 
includes care by the extended family of the child, which is an important 
feature of South African family life. It is clear from s 28(1)(b) that the 
Constitution recognises that family life is important to the well-being of 
all children. Adoption is a valuable way of affording children the 
benefits of family life which might not otherwise be available to 
them. . . . However, we must approach the issues in the present matter 
 
 83. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 84. In terms of section 17(b) of the Act, a widower, widow, unmarried person, or divorced 
person can adopt a child. This is adoption by a single applicant. 
 85. ―Husband‖ and ―wife‖ refers only to marriages ordinarily recognized by the common law 
and legislation between heterosexual spouses. 
 86. The first applicant stated that she had played a significant role in the upbringing of the 
children and that the children regarded her as their mother. She was their principal source of 
emotional support due to the fact that the second applicant‘s career as a judge of the High Court 
placed severe strains on her time. The evidence clearly showed that the children have developed well 
and that they were aware of applicants‘ lesbian life style. 
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on the basis that family life as contemplated by the Constitution can be 
provided in different ways and that legal conceptions of the family and 
what constitutes family life should change as social practices and 
traditions change.
87
 
 
From this perspective the court proceeded to conclude that the 
impugned provisions excluded from their ambit potential joint adoptive 
parents who were unmarried, but were partners in a permanent same-sex 
life partnership and who would otherwise meet the criteria set out in the 
Child Care Act. Their exclusion, the court held, defeated the very 
essence and social purpose of adoption which is to provide for the 
stability, commitment, affection, and support important to a child‘s 
development, which can be offered by suitably qualified persons. 
Excluding same-sex life partners from adopting children jointly was 
clearly in conflict with the constitutionally entrenched principle of the 
best interests of the children in these circumstances. The provisions 
therefore deprived the children of the possibility of a loving and stable 
family life. This, the court stated, was a matter of grave concern given 
the social reality of parentless children in the country.
88
 
 
 87. Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at paras. 18–19 
(S. Afr.)  (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at paras. 21–22. The Court found that the non-recognition as a parent, in the context of 
her relationship with the second applicant and their relationship with the siblings, perpetuated the 
fiction of family homogeneity based on the one mother/one father model. The failure by the law to 
recognize the value and worth of the first applicant as a parent to the siblings was, the court found, 
demeaning and limited her right to dignity. 
  In J v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs, the constitutionality of section 5 of 
the (now repealed) Children‘s Status Act 82 of 1987 was considered. 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). This Act dealt with, inter alia, the status of children conceived by artificial insemination. In 
casu the second applicant gave birth to twins, a boy and a girl. They were conceived by artificial 
insemination. The male sperm was obtained from an anonymous donor and the female ova were 
obtained from the first applicant. Both applicants wanted to be registered and recognized as parents 
of the twins. There was no legal impediment with regard to the second applicant as the ―birth-
mother‖ being registered as a parent under the regulations in terms of the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 51 of 1992. However, these regulations only made provision for the registration of 
one male and one female parent. Children‘s Status Act 82 of 1987 § 5(1)(a): 
 
Whenever the gamete or gametes of any person other than a married woman or her 
husband have been used with the consent of both that woman and her husband for the 
artificial insemination of that woman, any child born of that woman as a result of such 
artificial insemination shall for all purposes be deemed to be the legitimate child of that 
woman and her husband as if the gamete or gametes of that woman or her husband  were 
used for such artificial insemination. 
 
The Court in essence followed the line of reasoning of Du Toit but went on to say that just as the 
legal consequences of marriage are many and complex, the mutual relationship between parent and 
child is complex, valuable and multi-faceted.  In the same vein as it was not appropriate for Courts to 
determine the details of the relationship between partners to same-sex (or heterosexual 
relationships), so little was it for them to work out the relationship between any such partners and 
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Although the court did not specifically refer to any of the approaches 
relating to homosexuality of a parent and children, it is clear that it did 
follow the nexus approach as explained above. The court relied strongly 
on the report of a social worker, who recommended both applicants as 
suitable parents and also declared that it would be in the best interests of 
the children to be adopted by the applicants jointly. The court also 
pointed out that in terms of the Child Care Act, the children‘s court may 
not grant an adoption unless it is satisfied, inter alia, that 
 
 (a) the applicants are possessed of adequate means to 
maintain and educate the child;
89
 
 (b) the applicant or applicants are of good repute and a person 
or persons fit and proper to be entrusted with the custody of the 
child;
90
 and 
 (c) the proposed adoption will serve the interests and conduce 
to the welfare of the child.
91
 
 
In terms of the Child Care Act, children‘s courts are charged with 
overseeing the well-being of children by examining the qualifications of 
applicants in adoption applications. The provisions of the Act, the court 
found, offered a coherent policy of child and family welfare by creating 
children‘s courts and establishing overall guidelines to advance the 
welfare of children. They are able and well equipped to prevent abuses. 
Against this exposition of the role of the children‘s court to advance 
the welfare of the child and its reliance on the report of the social worker 
indicating that the joint adoption would be in the best interests of the 
children, there can be no doubt that the court in Du Toit was not prepared 
to follow either the per se or the middle ground approach. In fact, it 
availed itself comprehensively of the evidence that the sexual behavior of 
the parents would not have a detrimental effect on the well-being of the 
children. 
At the time of writing of this article, the Child Care Act is still in 
existence as only certain sections of the Children‘s Act92 have come into 
operation. The Child Care Act has not been repealed as yet. It should be 
noted, though, that chapter 15 of the Children‘s Act, which deals with the 
adoption of children, is in line with the exposition in Du Toit and the 
 
their children. Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Dev., 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) para. 26 (S. 
Afr.). 
 89. Child Care Act 74 of 1983 § 18(4)(a). 
 90. Id. at § 18(4)(b). 
 91. Id. at § 18(4)(c). 
 92. Children‘s Act 38 of 2005. 
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other decisions discussed supra. In terms of this chapter the purposes of 
adoption are to protect and nurture children by providing a safe, healthy 
environment with positive support and to promote the goals of 
permanency planning by connecting children to other safe and nurturing 
family relationships intended to last a lifetime.
93
 Children may also only 
be adopted if the adoption will be in the best interests of the child
94
 and if 
the child is adoptable.
95
 An adoption social worker must make an 
assessment whether a child is adoptable.
96
 
Section 231 of the Children‘s Act deviates radically from the 
provisions of the Child Care Act in respect to people who may adopt a 
child. It provides that a child may be adopted jointly by a husband and 
wife; partners in a permanent domestic relationship; or persons sharing a 
common household and forming a permanent family unit.
97
 A child may 
also be adopted individually by a widower or widow; divorced or 
unmarried person; a married person whose spouse is the parent of the 
child or by a person whose permanent domestic life-partner is the parent 
of the child;
98
 by the biological father of a child born out of wedlock; or 
by the foster parent of the child.
99
 
It is important to note from the previous paragraph that 
homosexuality is nowhere mentioned as a ground that disqualifies a 
person as a prospective adoptive parent. This is also borne out by section 
231(2), which provides that a prospective parent must be fit and proper 
to be entrusted with full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of 
the child; willing and able to undertake, exercise and maintain those 
responsibilities and rights; over the age of 18; and properly assessed by 
an adoption social worker to ensure that the person is fit and proper, and 
willing and able as explained above.
100
 The adoption social worker may 
take the cultural and community diversity of the adoptable child and 
prospective adoptive parent into consideration in his or her assessment of 
the prospective adoptive parent. A prospective adoptive parent also may 
 
 93. Id. at § 229. 
 94. Id. at § 230(1)(a). 
 95. Id. at § 230(1)(b). 
 96. Id. at § 230(2). A child is adoptable in terms of this section if he/she is an orphan and has 
no guardian or caregiver who is willing to adopt the child; if the whereabouts of the child‘s parent or 
guardian cannot be established; if the child has been abandoned; if the child‘s parent or guardian has 
abused or deliberately neglected the child, or has allowed the child to be abused or deliberately 
neglected; or the child is in need of permanent alternative placement. 
 97. Id. at § 231(1)(a). 
 98. It is important to note that section 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 provides that the 
legal consequences of marriage apply with such changes as may be required by the context to a civil 
union. 
 99. Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 § 231(1)(b). 
 100. Id. at § 231(2). 
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not be disqualified because of financial reasons—he or she may apply for 
means-tested social assistance. A person unsuitable to work with children 
is not a fit and proper person to adopt a child.
101
 
Sections 239 and 240 further bear out on the consideration of an 
adoption application. Section 239 prescribes, inter alia, that the adoption 
social worker must furnish the court with a report which contains 
information that the child is adoptable and that the adoption will be in the 
best interest of the child. In terms of section 240 a court must take all 
relevant factors into account, which may include the religious and 
cultural background of the child, the child‘s parent, and the prospective 
adoptive parent. It must also consider the report of the adoption social 
worker and may only make an order for the adoption of a child if such 
will be in the best interest of the child and if the prospective adoptive 
parent complies with the requirements set out in section 231. 
It certainly is not argued that the grounds listed in section 231 
constitute a numerus clausus. In fact, it is abundantly clear that the 
intention of the legislature is to convey  discretion on the children‘s court 
to ensure that the best interests of the child will prevail, while at the same 
time not discriminating unfairly against homosexual persons who either 
jointly or individually want to adopt the child. It is submitted that the 
provision allowing a married person whose spouse is the parent of the 
child
102
 along with the reference to partners in a domestic life-partnership 
who may adopt a child conveys unambiguously that the legislature also 
chose the nexus standard—the homosexuality of the prospective 
adoptive parent or homosexual behavior will only be taken into 
consideration if it will have an adverse effect on the child‘s best interests. 
It is also submitted that this approach is in line with the reasoning of the 
Constitutional Court in its interpretation of the Constitution in the 
various decisions discussed above.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The South African Constitution ―is not merely a formal document 
regulating public power. It also embodies . . . an objective normative 
value system.‖103 This system is rooted in the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality, and freedom as embodied in the Bill of Rights 
entrenched in the Constitution. In S v Makwanyane the Constitutional 
Court considered the weight to be attached to public opinion in 
 
 101. Id. at § 231(2)(3), (4)(5)(6). 
 102. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
 103. Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para. 54 (S. Afr.). 
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contentious matters relating to dignity, equality, and freedom.
104
 The 
court was even prepared to assume that public opinion would favor the 
death penalty in extreme cases of murder. However, the court held that 
the question before it was not what the majority of South Africans 
believed to be a proper sentence, but on the contrary, what the 
Constitution allowed. It further held that a court should not allow itself to 
be diverted from its duty to act as an independent arbiter of the 
Constitution by making choices on the basis that such choices would find 
favor with the public.
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 The development of the constitutional position 
of lesbigay marriage and the relationship between such parents and 
children certainly bear testimony to this approach—the very reason for 
establishing the new constitutional order and for vesting the power of 
judicial review of all legislation and the common law in the courts was to 
protect the rights of minorities and others who cannot protect their rights 
adequately through the democratic process. Those who are entitled to 
claim this protection include the social outcasts and marginalized people 
of society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst and 
weakest amongst us that all of us can be secure that our own rights will 
be protected.
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 104. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 105. Id. para 87. 
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